UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF NORTH CAROLINA

NO.: 03-CV-39

DONALD SULLIVAN, LTC; JEFFREY S. SULLIVAN, SP4

plaintiff

v.

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, GEORGE W. BUSH, Honorable; JOEL HEFLEY, Honorable; Chairman, House Committee on Official Conduct; HENRY HYDE, Honorable, Chairman, House Committee on International Affairs; JOHN BARGO, Chiefof-Staff, House Committee on Official Conduct; 535 JOHN DOES

. Wilmington, North Carolina . March 21, 2003

defendant

MOTION FOR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER HEARING BEFORE THE HONORABLE JAMES C. FOX SENIOR UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT JUDGE

PAGES 1 - 25

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Proceedings recorded by stenomask, transcript produced from dictation.



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1
                         <u>PROCEEDINGS</u>
                                                        1:55 P.M.
 2
             THE COURT: GOOD MORNING, EVERYONE. PLEASE
 3
    BE SEATED.
 4
             COLONEL, I'D LIKE TO SEE YOU AND COUNSEL AT THE BENCH,
 5
    PLEASE. I'D LIKE TO SEE YOU UP HERE JUST A SECOND.
 6
             (BENCH CONFERENCE OFF THE RECORD.)
 7
             THE COURT:
                               ALL RIGHT, COLONEL, IT'S YOUR
 8 MOTION, I'LL BE GLAD TO HEAR FROM YOU.
 9
             MR. SULLIVAN: YOUR HONOR, I'LL BE BRIEF. MY
   NAME IS DONALD SULLIVAN. I'M ONE OF THE PLAINTIFFS IN THIS
10
   MATTER. AND I HOPE YOU'VE HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO READ MY
11
12
   COMPLAINT.
             THE COURT: WELL, I CAN ASSURE YOU I'VE READ
13 i
14 YOUR COMPLAINT, ALL THE EXHIBITS AND YOUR REPLIES AND YOUR
15
   RESPONSES.
16
             MR. SULLIVAN: OKAY. THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR.
17 UNFORTUNATELY, THE CO-PLAINTIFF IS NOT HERE TODAY. I DON'T KNOW
  WHERE HE IS. I CAN'T CONTACT HIM. HE'S BEEN MOVED. SO, WHERE
  HE IS IS UP TO THE PRESIDENT, I GUESS. SO, IF YOU WILL JUST
19
20
   BEAR WITH ME IN HIS ABSENCE.
             I WOULD LIKE TO SAY THAT MANY YEARS AGO, I TOOK AN
21
   OATH TO SUPPORT AND DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION AGAINST ALL ENEMIES
22
  FOREIGN AND DOMESTIC, AND FOR MANY YEARS I OBEYED THE ORDERS OF
23
24 THOSE IN PLACEDIN POSITIONS ABOVE ME WITHOUT QUESTION. AND
25
  HAVING GROWN UP IN THE VIETNAM ERA AND BEEN IN THE ARMY IN THE
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VIETNAM ERA, THERE WERE QUESTIONS, BUT I DIDN'T ASK THOSE QUESTIONS. AND AS I GREW OLDER, OLD AGE BEING & CURE FOR IGNORANCE, I BEGAN TO QUESTION THINGS. AND WHEN THIS IRAO MATTER CAME UP, I DECIDED I WOULDN'T GET INVOLVED IN THAT, NOT MY BUSINESS, AND I WAS JUST NOT -- I'M PAST THAT. AND THEN MY NEPHEW GOT ACTIVATED, AND AT THAT TIME IT SEEMED LIKE IMMINENT DEPLOYMENT, AND HE MAY BE THERE NOW. AS I SAID, I DON'T KNOW WHERE HE IS. AND I DECIDED THAT IT WAS TIME TO ASK THE QUESTIONS.

AND SO, I TALKED TO THE GOVERNOR; TALKED TO THE COMMANDER OF THE NATIONAL GUARD OF NORTH CAROLINA; WROTE LETTERS. AND AS YOU SAW IN THE EXHIBITS, TO THE CONGRESS ASKING HOW WE CAN DO THIS OVER AND OVER AND OVER WITHOUT SOMEONE STANDING UP AND STRAIGHTENING THINGS OUT. AND AFTER THE PHONE CALLS AND THE LETTERS AND NO RESPONSE, NOT EVEN RETURN PHONE CALLS IN SOME CASES FROM THE CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES, AND BECAUSE OF THE URGENCY OF THE CASE BEFORE THE COURT, I WENT AHEAD AND PUT THE DOCUMENTS TOGETHER AND FILED THE CASE.

THAT HAVING BEEN SAID, I WILL SAY THAT I BELIEVE THE

CASE STATES SUFFICIENT SUPPORT FOR A PRIMA FACIE CASE FOR A

RESTRAINING ORDER OR AT LEAST A STAY OF FURTHER HOSTILITIES. WE

CAN FILE BRIEFS IN SUPPORT, WHICH I DON'T REALLY THINK ARE

NECESSARY. THE EVIDENCE IS ALL VERY CLEAR. UNTIL THE CONGRESS

CAN MEET AND ISSUE A DECLARATION OF WAR TO THE PRESIDENT,

PLAINTIFFS STAND BY THEIR COMPLAINT. THE PLAINTIFFS ALSO PRAY

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THIS HONORABLE COURT DENY THE DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS THIS
 1
 2
    MATTER, AND IN THE ABSENCE OF A T.R.O., AT LEAST WE WILL THEN BE
    ABLE TO HAVE IT HEARD BEFORE A COURT AND A FINAL DECISION
 3
    RENDERED AND REQUIRE THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT TO AGAIN OBEY THE
 4
 5
    TENETS OF THE CONSTITUTION.
 6
              FURTHER I HAVE NOTHING, YOUR HONOR.
 7
              THE COURT:
                                  WELL, I THINK YOU RAISE SERIOUS
    ISSUES OF THE WAR POWERS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. IT HAS
 8
    BEEN A SOURCE OF A GREAT DEAL OF DISCUSSION FROM TIME TO TIME.
 9
    I'M FRANK TO SAY THAT IF I WERE TO GRANT YOUR TEMPORARY
10
    RESTRAINING ORDER I'M NOT FOR SURE HOW I WOULD ENFORCE IT, NOR
11
    WOULD I REALLY HAVE ANY -- ONE OF THE PROBLEMS OBVIOUSLY IS THAT
12
    JUST AS THERE ARE A GREAT MANY PROBLEMS THAT WOULD HAVE TO BE
13
14
    RESOLVED, POLICY ISSUES AND OTHERS BEFORE HOSTILITIES ARE
15
    COMMENCED, I'M QUITE SURE THAT THERE ARE SIMILARLY A GREAT
16
    NUMBER OF HOSTILITIES HAVING COMMENCED THAT I DON'T KNOW HOW THE
    COURT WOULD SUPERVISE THEIR TERMINATION IN ANY WAY, SHAPE OR
17
    FORM THAT WOULD INVOLVE -- THAT WOULD CERTAINLY INVOLVE POLICY
18
    DECISIONS. AND ONE OF THE ISSUES THAT -- I HAD ORIGINALLY SET
19
   YOUR CASE I THINK FOR THIS MORNING SOMETIME. WE TRIED TO REACH
20
21
    IT AS QUICKLY AS POSSIBLE, HAVING HAD THE CHANCE TO READ YOUR
   MATERIAL AND NOW THE GOVERNMENT'S RESPONSE AND YOUR REPLY.
22
23
             MR. SULLIVAN: I APPRECIATE THAT SENSE OF
24
   URGENCY, SIR.
                                  WELL, MR. LEPORE, I'LL BE GLAD TO
25
              THE COURT:
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HEAR WHAT YOU HAVE TO SAY FOR THE GOVERNMENT. I'VE READ YOUR
 1
 2
    BRIEF, AND I'LL BE GLAD TO HEAR ANYTHING YOU HAVE TO SAY IN ORAL
 3
    ARGUMENT.
 4
             MR. LEPORE: MAY IT PLEASE THE COURT, YOUR
    HONOR. MY NAME IS MATTHEW LEPORE AND I'M HERE FOR THE PRESIDENT
 5
    OF THE UNITED STATES AND NAMED MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.
 6
 7
             AND, JUDGE, WHAT YOU'RE BEING ASKED TO DO TODAY, AS
 8
   YOU'RE AWARE, HAS NEVER, EVER BEEN DONE IN THE HISTORY OF THIS
   NATION.
             THE COURT: WELL, THERE'S A LOT OF THINGS THAT
10
   HAVEN'T BEEN DONE IN THE HISTORY OF THIS NATION. COURTS ARE
11
   CALLED UPON TO DO THINGS THAT HAVE NEVER BEEN DONE BEFORE
12
   CONSTANTLY. THAT'S REALLY A MEANINGLESS ARGUMENT AS FAR AS I'M
13
   CONCERNED. THE RATIONALE AS TO WHY I SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT DO
14
15
   SOMETHING IS WHAT'S IMPORTANT.
16
             MR. LEPORE: OKAY, JUDGE, THEN I'LL GET RIGHT
17
   INTO THE POLITICAL QUESTION ISSUE. IN THE THREE CASES THAT
   RECENTLY HAVE DECIDED THIS VERY ISSUE WITH RESPECT TO THIS
18
   CURRENT CRISIS, I DIRECT YOUR HONOR TO DOE V. BUSH --
19
20
             THE COURT:
                                I'VE READ THAT.
             MR. LEPORE: OKAY. THE POLITICAL QUESTION
21
22
   DOCTRINE, JUDGE, COUNSELS COURTS NOT TO GET INVOLVED IN ISSUES
   THAT ARE RELEGATED TO THE POLITICAL BRANCHES: THE EXECUTIVE
23
24
   BRANCH AND THE LEGISLATIVE BRANCH. AND IF THERE IS ONE ISSUE
25
   THAT ROUTINELY IS FOUND TO BE A POLITICAL QUESTION, IN THE
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FOURTH CIRCUIT AND CIRCUITS AROUND THE COUNTRY, IT IS THAT INVOLVING WAR POWERS.

THE COURT: WELL, LET ME SAY THIS: THE COLONEL MAKES A POINT HE'S NOT TRYING TO SAY WHETHER OR NOT WE SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT GO TO WAR. HIS ISSUE IS WHETHER OR NOT -- THE POLICY OF WHETHER TO GO TO WAR OR NOT IS NOT THE ISSUE HE RAISES. THE ISSUE THAT HE RAISES IS WHETHER OR NOT CONGRESS IS REQUIRED TO ACT, PURSUANT TO ITS WAR POWERS CONFERRED UPON IT, PRIOR TO THE EXECUTIVE ACTING.

I MEAN, I DON'T PERCEIVE US TO BE ARGUING THE MERITS OR LACK OF MERITS TO THE CURRENT CONFLICT. IT'S STRICTLY A QUESTION OF THE PROCEDURAL POSTURE OF THE GOVERNMENT AS TO WHETHER OR NOT WHAT IT SHOULD OR SHOULD NOT HAVE DONE IN THIS CASE.

I THINK THE POLITICAL QUESTION ISSUE MAKES ITSELF MORE
-- PERHAPS MORE APPARENT IF YOU PUT THE FACTUAL ISSUE IN
REVERSE. FOR EXAMPLE, IF CONGRESS HAD DECLARED WAR, AND ONLY
THE PRESIDENT COULD MAKE WAR, AND SUPPOSE HE REFUSED TO DO IT,
THEN WHAT WOULD THE COURT DO? IF THE COURT WENT IN AND ORDERED
HIM TO MAKE WAR AND THEN SUPERVISED ITS ORDER, IT WOULD HAVE
EFFECTIVELY USURPED THE ENTIRE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. BY THE SAME
TOKEN, IF THE COUNTRY WAS TO ENGAGE IN HOSTILITIES WITHOUT ITS
BEING THRUST UPON IT, FOR EXAMPLE, THE ATTACK ON PEARL HARBOR OR
WHATEVER, THE PRESIDENT MIGHT GO TO THE CONGRESS AND SAY, "HOW
ABOUT DECLARING WAR?" AND THE CONGRESS MIGHT SAY, "NO, WE'RE NOT

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GOING TO DO IT." AND IF THE COURT ORDERED THE CONGRESS TO

DECLARE WAR, WELL, OBVIOUSLY, IT WOULD HAVE USURPED THE ENTIRE

LEGISLATIVE BRANCH.
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I MEAN, IF YOU PUT THE ISSUE IN REVERSE, I THINK IT
BECOMES PRETTY APPARENT THAT THE COURT COULD NOT RESPOND TO
EITHER OF THOSE SCENARIOS WITHOUT, IN FACT, TOTALLY IGNORING THE
SEPARATION OF POWERS. BUT THAT'S JUST SOMETHING THAT OCCURRED
TO ME. IT HAS NO BEARING IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE. HOWEVER,
I THINK IT DOES RAISE ISSUES OF, OR PUT MORE IN FOCUS, PERHAPS,
THE POLITICAL QUESTION ASPECT THAT YOU'VE RAISED.

BUT GO AHEAD, I DIDN'T MEAN TO INTERRUPT YOU.

THE ISSUES YOU JUST RAISED WITH RESPECT TO HOW CONGRESS WOULD RATIFY OR APPROVE A PRESIDENTIAL DECISION OR HOW THE PRESIDENT WOULD RESPOND TO A CONGRESSIONAL DECISION ARE EXACTLY THE TYPE OF POLITICAL QUESTIONS THAT WE ARE SAYING, THE PARTICULAR ISSUE BEFORE THE COURT, WHETHER OR NOT THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS WITH RESPECT TO THE CURRENT CRISIS ARE UNCONSTITUTIONAL, AND THOSE ARE THE POLITICAL QUESTIONS. AND AS YOUR HONOR JUST SAID, THOSE ARE THE ISSUES THAT WOULD BE USURPING THE LEGISLATIVE AND THE EXECUTIVE POWER, AND THAT'S WHY WE FEEL THAT THIS PARTICULAR CASE EPITOMIZES THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE AS SET FORTH BY TIFFANY AND THE SUPREME COURT IN GILLIGAN.

THE COURT: WELL, IT WOULD BE YOUR VIEW, I

PRESUME, THAT THE RECOURSE THAT THE CITIZENRY HAS IS THROUGH THE

15 l

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POLITICAL PROCESS.
 2
              MR. LEPORE: THAT'S PRECISELY THE RECOURSE IN
    THESE TYPES OF CASES, THE POLITICAL PROCESS. AND IN THIS CASE,
 3
    YOUR HONOR, THE CONGRESS HAS SPOKEN CLEARLY ON THIS PARTICULAR
 4
    ISSUE IN OCTOBER OF 2002 WITH A RESOLUTION. AND IN FACT, JUST
 5
    TODAY, AND I DIDN'T GET TO PUT THESE IN THE BRIEF BECAUSE THEY
 6
 7
    WERE JUST LITERALLY LAST NIGHT AND TODAY, CONGRESS -- BOTH
    CONGRESS AND THE SENATE HAVE AGAIN SPOKEN SUPPORTING THE
 8
 9
    PRESIDENT'S USE OF FORCE WITH RESPECT TO THE CONSTITUTION. SO,
    ALL OF THE POLITICAL BRANCHES ARE IN UNISON HERE, AND THIS ISSUE
10
11
    IS RESOLVED.
12
             THE COURT: WELL, I TEND TO AGREE CONGRESS
   CERTAINLY IMPLICITLY HAS DECLARED WAR, IMPLICITLY IN THE SENSE
13
    THAT THEY HAVE LONG ARGUED FOR AND SUPPORTED AN AGGRESSIVE
14
    RESPONSE TOWARDS IRAQ AND ITS POLICIES SINCE THE 1991 CONFLICT.
15
16
             WAS IT '91?
17
             MR. LEPORE: YES, SIR, THAT'S TRUE.
18
             THE COURT: AND ITS NO FLY ZONE, ET CETERA,
   AND I THINK YOU CAN MAKE AN ARGUMENT THAT CONGRESS IMPLICITLY
19
20
   HAS DECLARED WAR.
21
             BUT ONE OF THE PROBLEMS THAT FRANKLY EVOLVES FROM THE
   POLITICAL PROCESS IS THE FACT THAT PEOPLE ENGAGED IN POLITICS
22
23
   SELDOM WANT TO BE FORCED TO MAKE A STAND, OR STAND AND BE
   COUNTED. WE FIND AS THE JUDICIARY, NOT INFREQUENTLY CONGRESS
25
   ENACTS VAGUE LEGISLATION WHICH COMPELS THE COURTS TO CONSTRUE
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IT, AND THEN THE COURTS WHO CONSTRUE HAVE BEEN ACCUSED OF
 1
    JUDICIAL ACTIVISM WHEN THEY'VE BEEN FORCED INTO THAT SITUATION
 2
    BY NONE OTHER THAN THEIR ACCUSER. AND TO SOME EXTENT I THINK,
 3
    YOU KNOW, YOU CAN ARGUE THAT THE CONGRESS OWES IT TO THE
 4
 5
   AMERICAN PUBLIC TO BELLY UP TO THE BAR, SO TO SPEAK, AND DECLARE
   WAR IF THEY'RE REALLY GOING TO ENGAGE IN HOSTILITIES.
 6
 7
             NOW, SOMETHING THERE HAS PUZZLED ME A LITTLE BIT --
   AND AGAIN, I'M JUST TALKING OUT LOUD FOR THE PURPOSES OF OUR
 8
 9
   DISCUSSION HERE -- TWO ASPECTS: ONE, I THINK THAT WE WOULD ALL
10
   AGREE THAT IF SOMEONE ATTACKED THIS COUNTRY, THE EXECUTIVE
11
   SHOULD BE PREPARED TO ENGAGE IN HOSTILITIES TO THE UTMOST FORCE,
12
   WITHOUT A DECLARATION OF WAR. WOULD YOU AGREE WITH THAT,
13
   COLONEL?
14
             MR. SULLIVAN: (NO RESPONSE)
15
             THE COURT:
                               WELL, LET ME PUT IT THIS WAY: DO
16 YOU THINK WE SHOULD HAVE SHOT BACK AT PEARL HARBOR OR NOT?
             MR. SULLIVAN: SIR?
17
18
             THE COURT: DO YOU THINK THEY SHOULD HAVE SHOT
   BACK AT PEARL HARBOR OR NOT?
19
20
             MR. SULLIVAN: ANY TIME WE'RE ATTACKED, WE CAN
21
   DEFEND OURSELVES, YES, SIR.
22
             THE COURT: YES, SIR, I CERTAINLY AGREE WITH
23
   THAT.
24
             MR. SULLIVAN: WE CAN GET THE ACT OF WAR NEXT
25 l
  WEEK, BUT THE ACT OF WAR HAS TO BE IMPLEMENTED FOR THE PRESIDENT
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TO BE COMMANDER IN CHIEF. FOR HIM TO TAKE AWESOME CONTROL --
 2
              THE COURT: EXCUSE ME. I DON'T THINK THAT
 3
    THAT'S CORRECT. HE'S THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF. IT'S ONLY WHEN
    THE MILITIA ARE CALLED UP THAT HE BECOMES THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF
 4
 5
    OF THE MILITIA. BUT HE'S THE COMMANDER IN CHIEF OF THE UNITED
 6
    STATES ARMY AND NAVY AND OTHER ARMED FORCES AT ALL TIMES.
 7
              MR. LEPORE, YOU HAVE ANYTHING FURTHER YOU WANT TO ADD
 8
    ON THIS ISSUE?
 9
             MR. LEPORE: YES, SIR, I WAS GOING TO ADD WHAT
10
    YOU JUST SAID, THE PRESIDENT IS ALWAYS COMMANDER IN CHIEF AND
    HAS COMMANDER IN CHIEF EXECUTIVE POWERS, WHICH ARE NOT LIMITED
11
    LIKE CONGRESS'S ARE, IN THE CONSTITUTION. AND THE OTHER I THINK
12
    REAL IMPORTANT DISTINCTION ON THIS DECLARATION OF WAR DISCUSSION
13
    THAT WE'RE HAVING NOW IS THE DIFFERENCE -- AND YOUR HONOR SAID
14
    THIS EARLIER -- BETWEEN DECLARING WAR AND ENGAGING OR MAKING
15
   WAR. AND THROUGHOUT AN ENTIRE HISTORY OF THIS COUNTRY,
16
   PRESIDENTS OVER A HUNDRED TIMES HAVE ENGAGED IN WAR WITHOUT
17
18
   CONGRESSIONAL DECLARATION OF WAR. IN FACT ONLY FIVE TIMES --
19
             THE COURT:
                                WELL, I THINK THE COLONEL'S POINT
20
   THERE IS 40 WRONGS DON'T MAKE A RIGHT.
             MR. LEPORE: WELL, I MEAN, THE SUPREME COURT
21
22
   HAS SAID THAT IF YOU LOOK AT THE HISTORY OF THE BRANCHES, THAT
   IS VERY ILLUSTRATIVE AS TO HOW THE CONSTITUTION SHOULD BE
23
24
   INTERPRETED. AND ON THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE AGAIN, FORMAL --
25
   WELL, NO COURT HAS EVER HELD -- AGAIN, I KNOW YOU DON'T LIKE
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1
   THIS ARGUMENT -- BUT NO COURT HAS EVER HELD THAT THE POWER TO
 2
   DECLARE WAR EQUALS THE POWER TO ENGAGE IN WAR. AND THEY ARE
   VERY DISTINCT.
 3
             THE COURT: WELL, I QUITE AGREE WITH YOU ON
 5
   THAT.
 6
             MR. LEPORE: AND I MEAN, MASSACHUSETTS V.
7
   LAIRD, THE FIRST CIRCUIT CASE ON THIS ISSUE SAID IT GREAT, AND I
8
   QUOTE IT, AND I CAN READ IT FOR YOU. IT SAID, "CONGRESS DID NOT
   RECEIVE THE POWER TO MAKE WAR. THE CONGRESS WAS GIVEN THE POWER
9
10
   TO DECLARE WAR AND NOTHING WAS SAID ABOUT UNDECLARED
   HOSTILITIES. THE DRAFTERS OF THE CONSTITUTION, WHO WERE NOT
11
12
   INEPT, DID NOT SAY 'POWER TO COMMENCE WAR,' NOR DID THEY SAY 'NO
13
   WAR SHALL BE ENGAGED IN WITHOUT A DECLARATION BY CONGRESS.'"
14
             IT IS A SHARED RESPONSIBILITY BETWEEN THE POWERS, AND
   IN THIS PARTICULAR CASE, THEY ARE SHARING THOSE DUTIES PERFECTLY
15
16
   AND THEY ARE IN ABSOLUTE ACCORD ON THIS ISSUE.
17
             THE COURT: WELL, I COULDN'T AGREE WITH YOU
   MORE THAT THE WAR POWERS ARE GIVEN TO THE LEGISLATIVE AND
18
19
   EXECUTIVE BRANCHES. THE JUDICIARY HAS NO WAR POWERS CONFERRED
20
   UPON IT BY THE CONSTITUTION, WHEREAS THE OTHERS EXPLICITLY DO.
21
             THERE IS ONE OTHER ASPECT ABOUT THIS THAT WE TOUCHED
   UPON BRIEFLY, AND THAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE CONFLICT ITSELF AND
22
23
   THE FACT THAT IT IS NO LONGER INCHOATE. THAT IS TO SAY, AND
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I'LL USE THIS ANALOGY, IF MY WONDERFUL LABRADOR DOG GETS IN A

SCRAP WITH A 'COON AND I MAY NOT WANT IT TO SCRAP, I MAY ORDER

24

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IT NOT TO FIGHT AND TRY TO CALL HER OFF, BUT ONCE IN, SHE'S
    THERE; SHE'S GOT NO WAY TO GET OUT. ONCE SHE GETS THERE -- I
 2
 3
    MEAN, IN A SENSE, WE CAN ORDER THE PRESIDENT TO STOP THE WAR
    TOMORROW, BUT I DON'T KNOW WHETHER MR. HUSSEIN WOULD CONSIDER
 4
 5
    HIMSELF BOUND BY ANY OF OUR ORDERS. I MEAN, I THINK THAT THERE
 6
    IS A PROBLEM THERE THAT HASN'T BEEN, AS FAR AS I KNOW, ADDRESSED
 7
    IN ANY PARTICULAR -- AT ALL IN ANY OF THE WAR POWERS CASE, CASES
    THAT I'VE READ. AND THAT IS, ONCE IN -- WITHOUT REGARD TO HOW
 8
 9
   WE GOT THERE -- ONCE IN, IT'S NOT AS THOUGH YOU'VE GOT --
10
   THERE'S NO BRANCH OF THIS GOVERNMENT THAT YOU CAN COMPEL THE
11
   EXTRACTION FROM. IT TAKES TWO TO BRING THOSE HOSTILITIES TO AN
12
   END.
13
              I'M QUITE CONFIDENT, AND I SAY THIS SINCERELY,
   COLONEL, THAT YOU WOULDN'T HAVE US JUST THROW DOWN OUR ARMS AND
14
15
   WALK AWAY FROM THE BATTLEFIELD OVER THERE. THAT WOULDN'T BE
16:
   VERY SMART. WE COULDN'T DO THAT.
17
              IN OTHER WORDS, WE HAVE A QUESTION HERE OF REALLY
18
   WHETHER OR NOT THERE IS ANY JUDICIAL REMEDY. I MEAN, IT MAY BE
   AN ISSUE THAT IS A GENUINE ONE. I'M NOT BELITTLING YOUR
19
20
   ARGUMENT IN THE SLIGHTEST, COLONEL. I THINK THAT YOU'VE RAISED
21
   A GENUINE ISSUE THAT I THINK HAS TROUBLED A GREAT MANY PEOPLE
22
   FOR A LONG PERIOD OF TIME.
23
             MR. LEPORE: WELL, I COULDN'T AGREE MORE WITH
24
   RESPECT TO THE LACK OF JUDICIAL REMEDY, JUDGE, AND I THINK THAT
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RIGHT NOW YOU'RE DISCUSSING THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE. WE DIDN'T

```
RAISE THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE BECAUSE HE IS ALSO MAKING THE CLAIM
 1
 2
    TO STOP THE ONGOING WAR. AND WE CERTAINLY AGREE THAT ANY
    ATTEMPT TO NOW STOP -- PREVENT A WAR IS MOOT; IT'S A MOOT ISSUE.
 3
 4
    BUT TO STOP THE ONGOING WAR, WE DIDN'T PARTICULARLY RAISE THAT.
 5
    AND WE WOULD SAY THAT UNDER ANY JUSTICIABILITY DOCTRINE, YOU
 6
    COME BACK TO THE SAME AREA, WHICH IS THAT THIS TYPE OF ISSUE,
 7
    WHETHER TO STOP AN ONGOING WAR, AS A POLITICAL QUESTION IS NOT
 8
    JUSTICIABLE UNDER THE STANDING DOCTRINE, THE MOOTNESS DOCTRINE.
 9
   AND THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE PRIMARILY.
              THE COURT:
10
                                WELL, AS FAR AS THE TEMPORARY
   RESTRAINING ORDER OR AN INJUNCTION IS CONCERNED, GENERALLY --
11
12
   AND I DON'T MEAN TO BE FACETIOUS IN BRINGING THIS UP, BUT IN THE
13
   NORMAL CONTEXT OF AN INJUNCTION YOU REQUIRE A BOND TO PROTECT
14
    THE OPPOSING PARTY. IF THE PERSON WHO GETS THE INJUNCTION, IF
15
   HE ASKS FOR IT AND GETS IT, YOU REQUIRE HIM TO POST A BOND TO
16
   PROTECT THE OTHER PARTY. THAT OBVIOUSLY WOULD BE IMPOSSIBLE IN
17
   THIS PARTICULAR CASE. THAT WHOLE CONCEPT HAS NO BEARING ON THE
18
   ISSUE.
19
              IN OTHER WORDS, THE GOVERNMENT, IN A VERY REAL SENSE,
20
   COULD NEVER BE MADE WHOLE, WHEREAS I PRESUME INDIVIDUALS COULD
21
   BE MADE WHOLE INSOFAR AS OUR CONCEPTS OF DAMAGES ARE APPLICABLE.
22
   I WOULD BE THE FIRST TO ENTIRELY AGREE THAT, FOR EXAMPLE, IF
23
   YOUR NEPHEW -- IS IT YOUR NEPHEW, COLONEL?
24
             MR. SULLIVAN: YES, SIR.
25
             THE COURT: IF HE WERE TO BE BADLY INJURED OR,
```

GOD FORBID, KILLED IN ACTION, UNDER OUR PERSONAL INJURY AND
WRONGFUL DEATH STATUTES, ET CETERA, THE REMEDY AS FAR AS DAMAGES
IS CONCERNED IS ALWAYS MONEY, WHICH IS CERTAINLY IMPRECISE.

THERE'S NO WAY TO PLACE A VALUE ON THOSE THINGS, AND YET, ON THE
OTHER HAND, JURIES ARE CALLED UPON TO DO SO EVERY DAY. IT'S
JUST THAT WE HAVE NO OTHER WAY TO HANDLE IT.

I'M RELYING PRIMARILY ON A CASE, GOLDWATER V. CARTER.

AND THIS IS IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT. JUSTICE BRENNAN MADE THE

FOLLOWING COMMENTS THAT I THINK HAVE SOME VALUE. I'M JUST GOING

TO READ THIS AND THEN I'M GOING TO COMMENT ON IT.

"AS SET FORTH IN THE SEMINAL CASE OF BAKER V. CARR,

THE DOCTRINE" -- THIS IS THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE -- "THE

DOCTRINE INCORPORATES THREE INQUIRIES: DOES THE ISSUE INVOLVE

RESOLUTION OF QUESTIONS COMMITTED BY THE TEXT OF THE

CONSTITUTION TO A COORDINATE BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT." IN THAT

CASE, THERE'S NO QUESTION ABOUT IT. OUR CONSTITUTION TEXTUALLY

GIVES CONGRESS THE POWER TO DECLARE WAR AND GIVES THE PRESIDENT

THE POWER TO MAKE WAR.

THE SECOND QUESTION IS "WOULD RESOLUTION OF THE QUESTION DEMAND THAT THE COURT MOVE BEYOND AREAS OF JUDICIAL EXPERTISE." AT FIRST BLUSH, YOU MIGHT ANSWER THAT QUESTION NO, BUT I THINK THE ANSWER IS YES THAT IT WOULD, BECAUSE I THINK IF WE WERE TO RESTRAIN THE PRESIDENT IN ANY FASHION, I BELIEVE THAT THE COURT, IN ORDER TO FASHION SOME TYPE OF ORDER, WOULD HAVE TO FASHION A REMEDY OR A METHODOLOGY FOR STOPPING HOSTILITIES THAT

I THINK IT WOULD BE TOTALLY INEPT ATTEMPTING.

BY VARIOUS DEPARTMENTS ON ONE QUESTION."

AND THEN, THE THIRD QUESTION IS "DO PRUDENTIAL CONSIDERATIONS COUNSEL AGAINST JUDICIAL INTERVENTION." AS I'VE INDICATED, THERE'S NO QUESTION THERE'S A TEXTUALLY DEMONSTRABLE CONSTITUTIONAL COMMITMENT OF THE WAR ISSUES TO TWO COORDINATE POLITICAL DEPARTMENTS, BOTH THE LEGISLATIVE AND THE EXECUTIVE. I THINK THERE IS A LACK OF JUDICIALLY DISCOVERABLE AND MANAGEABLE STANDARDS FOR RESOLVING -- THAT IS TO SAY FOR TERMINATING OR BRINGING THE HOSTILITIES TO A HALT. AND I THINK THAT, AS INDICATED, THE POLITICAL QUESTION DOCTRINE RESTS IN PART ON PRUDENTIAL CONCERNS CALLING FOR MUTUAL RESPECT FROM THE THREE BRANCHES OF GOVERNMENT. AND I'M READING FROM THIS CASE.

"THE JUDICIAL BRANCH SHOULD AVOID THE POTENTIALITY OF EMBARRASSMENT THAT WOULD RESULT FROM MULTIFARIOUS PRONOUNCEMENTS

HERE WE WOULD HAVE A PRONOUNCEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT, EXECUTIVE, HE'S GOING TO MAKE WAR; BY THE CONGRESS, THEIR PRONOUNCEMENT WAS IN THE FORM OF A RESOLUTION IN THE PAST OR SOME OTHER; THEN YOU'D HAVE THE COURT'S ORDER ITSELF.

AND THEN HE CONCLUDES BY SAYING, "SIMILARLY, THE DOCTRINE RESTRAINS JUDICIAL ACTION WHERE THERE IS AN UNUSUAL NEED FOR UNQUESTIONING ADHERENCE TO A POLITICAL DECISION ALREADY MADE." NOW, THAT IS THE POINT THAT I RAISED A MOMENT AGO. WE ARE IN NOW, WHETHER WE WANT TO BE OR NOT, AND I THINK THAT THERE PROBABLY IS AN UNUSUAL NEED FOR UNQUESTIONING ADHERENCE TO THE

1 POLITICAL QUESTION, THAT IS, THE ENGAGEMENT OF WAR THAT'S 2 ALREADY BEEN MADE BY THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH.

I THINK THERE ARE OTHER ASPECTS THAT DO HAVE A
BEARING. I THINK THERE IS A GENUINE QUESTION AS TO STANDING IN
THE SENSE THAT, YOU KNOW, NOT INFREQUENTLY THERE ARE TAXPAYERS'
SUITS TO STOP THE EXPENDITURE OF MONEY ON THE BASIS THAT THE
PLAINTIFF IS A TAXPAYER. THERE'S NO QUESTION HE'S FINANCING IT.
BUT THAT HAS NEVER BEEN -- THAT TYPE OF STANDING HAS NEVER BEEN
RECOGNIZED. AND I THINK IN A VERY REAL SENSE, I'M NOT SURE THAT
THERE IS STANDING IN THIS PARTICULAR INSTANCE.

NOW, LET ME SAY THAT IF THERE WERE -- AS I THINK IT
WAS THE DOE CASE REFERS TO, IF THERE WAS COLLISION BETWEEN THE
CONGRESS AND THE PRESIDENT -- THAT IS TO SAY, THEY HAD DIFFERENT
VIEWS AND WERE ANTAGONISTIC -- IF THE CONGRESS ITSELF OR THE TWO
BRANCHES WERE DIRECTLY ANTAGONISTIC TO ONE ANOTHER, THEN I THINK
IN THAT EVENT THE COURT MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO RESOLVE THE ISSUES.

THIS WAS, AGAIN, IN A DIFFERENT CONTEXT. IT WAS
COMMENTED, BRENNAN AGAIN, "IF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS HAVE
REACHED IRRECONCILABLE POSITIONS, FINAL DISPOSITION OF THE
QUESTION PRESENTED BY THIS CASE WOULD ELIMINATE, RATHER THAN
CREATE, MULTIPLE CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATIONS. THE SPECTER OF
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT BROUGHT TO A HALT BECAUSE OF THE MUTUAL
INTRANSIGENCE OF THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS WOULD REQUIRE THIS
COURT TO PROVIDE A RESOLUTION PURSUANT TO OUR DUTY TO SAY WHAT
THE LAW IS." AND I THINK THAT IF CONGRESS TOOK A POSITION

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ADVERSE TO THE GOVERNMENT, TO THE EXECUTIVE, ON THIS ISSUE OR
   ANY OTHER ISSUE, THAT UNDOUBTEDLY THE COURT WOULD BE REQUIRED TO
 2
   RESOLVE THAT DISPUTE. BUT I THINK THAT'S A DIFFERENT SITUATION
 3
   THAN WHAT WE HAVE HERE.
              COLONEL, I'LL BE GLAD TO HEAR ANYTHING FURTHER YOU
 5
   HAVE TO SAY ON THIS ISSUE.
 6
7
             MR. SULLIVAN:
                                NOW?
              THE COURT:
                                YES, SIR.
8
              MR. SULLIVAN: THANK YOU, YOUR HONOR. YOU BRING
9
   UP AN INTERESTING QUESTION ABOUT THE DISSENSION BETWEEN THE
10
   CONGRESS AND THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH. WE DON'T HAVE DISSENSION IN
1.1
    THIS CASE, AND I'M NOT ARGUING THAT WE DO.
12
                                  I UNDERSTAND YOUR ARGUMENT.
13
              THE COURT:
    THINK THEY'VE GOT RATHER THAN COLLISION, THEY'VE GOT COLLUSION.
14
              MR. SULLIVAN: COLLUSION, EXACTLY. AND THE
15
   PROBLEM IS THAT I DON'T UNDERSTAND THE CONGRESS WHEN THEY'RE
   READING THE CONSTITUTION ON ITS FACE, AND THEY ALL TOOK THE SAME
17
    OATH YOU AND I DID, AND THEY CAN READ. IT'S PRETTY APPARENT
18
   WHAT IT MEANS WHEN IT SAYS WHAT IT MEANS. LIKE A PREACHER TELLS
19
   YOU WHAT THE BIBLE MEANS, WHEN YOU READ THE BIBLE YOU FIND OUT
20
    SOMETHING ENTIRELY DIFFERENT, YOU DON'T WANT TO READ THE BIBLE?
21
    AS I DON'T THINK THE CONGRESS WANTS TO READ THE CONSTITUTION,
22
    BECAUSE THEY LIKE WHAT THEY'RE BEING TOLD.
              I FEEL LIKE THE JUDICIAL BRANCH HAS A RESPONSIBILITY
24
   OF OVERSIGHT \chi PROTECTION OF THE CONSTITUTION AND WHAT IT SAYS,
25
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AND I DON'T UNDERSTAND WHY THE CONGRESS REFUSES TO JUST SAY "WE
 2
    DECLARE WAR ON IRAO." WE STEP AROUND THE ISSUE.
    THEY'RE TRYING TO MAINTAIN DENIABILITY FOR SOME REASON.
 3
 4
              THE COURT:
                                  WELL, I DON'T DISAGREE WITH YOU.
    AND I THINK THAT PROBABLY THE ONLY REMEDY FOR THAT IS TO THROW
 5
 6
    THE RASCALS OUT.
 7
              MR. SULLIVAN:
                                RIGHT. BUT WE EVIDENTLY ARE NOT
 8
    INTELLIGENT ENOUGH/SELECTIVE ENOUGH TO PICK THE RIGHT GUYS FOR
 9
    THESE JOBS BECAUSE THEY JUST DON'T SEEM TO BE ABLE TO READ THE
10
    CONSTITUTION, AND THEY'VE DONE THIS -- WELL, YOU MENTIONED PEARL
11
    HARBOR EARLIER. WE WERE ATTACKED AT PEARL HARBOR, WE DEFENDED
12
    OURSELVES, NOT VERY WELL, IN PEARL HARBOR. BUT THEN THE NEXT
13
    DAY THE PRESIDENT TOOK THE TIME OUT AND ASKED THE CONGRESS FOR A
14
    DECLARATION OF WAR, THE CONGRESS DECLARED THE WAR, AND WE DID
15
         IN THIS CASE, THE PRESIDENT COULD HAVE AT ANY TIME ASKED
16
    THE CONGRESS TO DECLARE WAR ON IRAQ AND THE CONGRESS WOULD HAVE
17
    HAD TO STEP UP TO THE PLATE. BUT THAT HAS NOT BEEN DONE.
18
    YOU SAY, IT'S COLLUSION.
19
              ANOTHER THING IS, ANOTHER ISSUE, IS THAT EACH BRANCH OF
20
    THE GOVERNMENT HAS THE AUTHORITY, BY SEPARATION OF POWERS, TO
21
    DENY ANOTHER BRANCH OF GOVERNMENT, AND THE PRESIDENT HAS DONE IT
    MANY TIMES. JEFFERSON DID IT. EVEN WITH MARTYRS AND MADISON,
22
23
    HE REFUSED TO DO WHAT THE COURT TOLD HIM TO DO. IN THE ALIEN
   AND SEDITION ACT OF 1898, HE REFUSED TO DO WHAT THE COURT TOLD
25
    HIM TO DO, AND HE HAS EVERY AUTHORITY. NOT ONLY DOES HE HAVE
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BUT

VETO POWER OVER THE CONGRESS, BEING A SEPARATE EQUAL BRANCH OF
THE GOVERNMENT, HE HAS VETO POWER OVER THE JUDICIAL BRANCH IF HE
DOESN'T AGREE WITH WHAT THEY SAY, AND WE ACKNOWLEDGE THAT.

AND WE'RE NOT ASKING -- WELL, WE DID ASK IN THE COMPLAINT, AND I REALLY NEVER EXPECTED US TO BE AT WAR THIS QUICKLY. AND I WAS SURPRISED AS MUCH AS ANYBODY, AND I WOULD NOT ASK THE COURT IN GOOD CONSCIENCE TO STOP HOSTILITIES NOW THEY'VE BEGUN, BUT I WOULD ASK THE COURT TO REQUIRE THE CONGRESS TO MAKE IT RIGHT FOR THE FUTURE SO THAT WE DON'T HAVE THIS SAME MISTAKE AGAIN.

WE'VE BEEN IN, AS I SAID IN MY COMPLAINT, 240

SINCE 1947,

DIFFERENT CONFLICTS, AND I CAN'T IDENTIFY ONE OF THOSE THAT WAS

PROTECTING MY DOMESTIC SECURITY OR MY CONSTITUTION. AND THE

PROBLEM IS THAT WE'VE ALLOWED OURSELVES TO BASICALLY BE OUT OF

CONTROL.

16 THE COURT: WELL, I THINK IT HAS OCCURRED OVER 17 -- I DON'T DISAGREE WITH EVERYTHING THAT YOU SAY. I THINK THAT IT HAS OCCURRED OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME, AND CONSEQUENTLY, 18 19 THERE IS LESS HESITANCY ON THE EXECUTIVE BRANCH TO PRESERVE ANYTHING. IT'S JUST LIKE KIDS WHO BREAK A RULE THE FIRST 200 21 TIMES AND AFTER A WHILE THEY DON'T CARE; THEY DON'T ACKNOWLEDGE THAT THE RULE EXISTS. I DON'T SAY THAT YOUR ARGUMENT IS WITHOUT 22 23 MERIT. I REALLY DON'T.

I THINK, HOWEVER, I MUST SAY THAT I THINK THAT THERE

IS -- THE COURSE OF CONDUCT OVER A LONG PERIOD OF TIME HAS

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11

12

13

14

1.5

24

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ADVANCED THAT COLLUSION, IF YOU WILL, BETWEEN THOSE TWO
    BRANCHES.
 3
             MR. SULLIVAN: DO WE NEED AN AMENDMENT THEN TO
    DELETE THAT PHRASE FROM THE CONSTITUTION? BECAUSE IT'S IN THERE
 4
    FOR A REASON. THOSE GUYS THAT WROTE THAT WERE NOT IGNORANT
 5
    THEY KNEW WHAT THEY WERE DOING.
 6
 7
             THE COURT:
                          I COULDN'T AGREE WITH YOU MORE.
 8
             MR. SULLIVAN: BECAUSE WITHOUT AN AMENDMENT, WE
   CAN'T IGNORE THAT PHRASE IN THE CONSTITUTION. IT MEANS WHAT IT
 9
10
   SAYS.
11
             THE COURT:
                                WELL, I UNDERSTAND YOUR ARGUMENT.
             DO YOU WANT TO RESPOND TO THAT, MR. LEPORE?
12
13
             MR. LEPORE: I JUST WANTED TO MAKE A FEW FINAL
14 l
  POINTS, BUT I WANTED TO MAKE SURE HE WAS --
15
             THE COURT: ANYTHING FURTHER YOU WANT TO SAY,
16 | COLONEL?
17
             MR. SULLIVAN: THAT'S ALL, THANK YOU, SIR.
18
             MR. LEPORE:
                               JUST VERY, VERY BRIEFLY, JUDGE.
19
   BACK WHEN I WAS SPEAKING A FEW MINUTES AGO, AND MR. SULLIVAN
20
   PICKED UP ON IT, YOU WERE TALKING ABOUT THE DOE CASE AND YOU
21
   WERE TALKING ABOUT THE CONCEPT OF A COLLISION BETWEEN THE
22
   BRANCHES, AND I JUST WANT TO POINT OUT THAT IN DOE, NO SUCH
   COLLISION WAS FOUND, AND THAT IS IN THIS PARTICULAR --
23
24
             THE COURT:
                                I AGREE WITH YOU. I DON'T THINK
  THE PROBLEM IS -- THERE'S NO COLLISION. I MEAN, THAT'S NOT
25
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HERE. I DON'T THINK THAT'S HERE. IF THAT WERE HERE, IT WOULD
 2
   BE A DIFFERENT BALL GAME.
 3
             MR. LEPORE: THERE COULD NOT BE A CASE MORE
   CLEAR THAT THE PARTIES ARE ACTUALLY NOT IN COLLISION. THEY ARE
 4
 5
   ONE HUNDRED PERCENT TOGETHER ON THIS POINT.
             WHEN YOU MENTIONED STANDING EARLIER, JUST LISTENING TO
   MR. SULLIVAN, I JUST WANT TO POINT OUT, AND AS THE COURT KNOWS,
 7
   I MEAN, GENERALIZED GRIEVANCES ARE NOT STANDING, AND IT SEEMS TO
   ME LIKE THAT'S WHERE WE'RE HEADED HERE. I JUST SAY THAT FOR
   WHAT IT'S WORTH.
10
11
             AND FINALLY, BACK TO THE DECLARATION OF WAR, I MEAN,
   THERE'S NO BREAKING OF RULES HERE. THERE'S NO COLLUSION HERE.
12
13
   THESE PARTIES --
             THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND.
14
15
             MR. LEPORE:
                               THESE BRANCHES ARE --
             THE COURT:
                                I DON'T MEAN TO SAY COLLUSION.
16
17
   THE QUESTION IS THAT THE -- HE'S ARGUING THAT THERE IS A --
   CONGRESS HAS DELEGATED ITS POWER. IT'S A DELEGATION ISSUE, I
18
19
   THINK, AS THE COLONEL SEES IT.
                          AND AS I SAID EARLIER, I RELY ON
20
             MR. LEPORE:
21
   THOSE ARGUMENTS AND OUR ARGUMENTS IN THE BRIEF. IT'S A SHARED
   POWER. EACH PARTY IS DOING ITS DUTY HERE, AND THE PRESIDENT IS
23
   COMMANDER IN CHIEF. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE HIS DETERMINATION.
24
             THE COURT: I WILL SAY I THINK, YOU KNOW,
25
   COLONEL, I HAVE TO TELL YOU THAT THERE ARE CASES WHERE A LONG
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1 COURSE OF HISTORY IN FACT DOES CHANGE THE CONSTITUTION, AND I

- 2 CAN THINK OF ONE INSTANCE. I BELIEVE I'M CORRECT ON THIS. I
- 3 THINK IF YOU WERE TO GO BACK AND TRY TO FIND AND REVIEW THE
- 4 RATIFICATION OF THE 16TH AMENDMENT, WHICH WAS THE INTERNAL
- 5 REVENUE, INCOME TAX, I THINK IF YOU WENT BACK AND EXAMINED THAT
- 6 CAREFULLY, YOU WOULD FIND THAT A SUFFICIENT NUMBER OF STATES
- 7] NEVER RATIFIED THAT AMENDMENT.
- 8 MR. SULLIVAN: TRUE STATEMENT.
- 9 THE COURT: AND NONETHELESS, I THINK IT'S FAIR
- 10 TO SAY THAT IT IS PART OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES,
- 11 AND I DON'T THINK ANY COURT WOULD EVER --
- 12 MR. SULLIVAN: I WOULD LOVE TO HAVE A VERY LONG
- 13 DISCUSSION WITH YOU ABOUT THAT SUBJECT.
- 14 THE COURT: -- WOULD SET IT ASIDE. WELL, I'VE
- 15 | SEEN THAT -- I'VE SEEN SOMEWHERE A TREATISE ON THAT, AND I THINK
- 16 IT WAS -- I THINK I'M CORRECT IN SAYING THAT ACTUALLY THE
- 17 RATIFICATION NEVER REALLY PROPERLY OCCURRED.
- 18 MR. SULLIVAN: CORRECT, SIR.
- 19 THE COURT: YET NONETHELESS, I'M SURE NO
- 20 COURT'S GOING TO SAY THAT THE 16TH AMENDMENT PERMITTING INCOME
- 21 TAX IS VOID FOR ANY REASON, ALTHOUGH I WOULDN'T MIND FILING FOR
- 22 A REBATE MYSELF.
- 23 BUT I THINK THAT THERE MAY BE SOMETHING ANALOGOUS
- 24 THERE VIS A VIS THE CONTINUED PRACTICE OF THE EXECUTIVE TO HAVE
- 25 INCURSIONS AND POLICE ACTIONS OR TO COMMIT THE COUNTRY TO

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HOSTILITIES WITHOUT THE FORMAL DECLARATION OF WAR.
 2
             ANYTHING FURTHER YOU'D LIKE TO ADD AT THIS TIME?
 3
             MR. LEPORE: NO, SIR, UNLESS YOU HAVE ANY
   OUESTIONS.
 4
             THE COURT: COLONEL, I'M NOT UNSYMPATHETIC TO
 5
   YOUR CAUSE.
 6
                               MAY I SAY ONE MORE THING?
 7
             MR. SULLIVAN:
 8
             THE COURT:
                                SURELY.
             MR. SULLIVAN: THAT ALL BEING WELL AND GOOD, I
9
   THINK WE'RE ALL COMFORTABLE WITH THE KNOWLEDGE THAT THE BAY OF
10
   TONKIN EVENT NEVER HAPPENED. THE PRESIDENT WENT INTO WAR
11
   WITHOUT THE CONGRESS'S CONSENT, WITHOUT THE CONGRESS'S
12
   DECLARATION OF WAR BECAUSE HE HAD THIS EVENT THAT TOOK PLACE.
13
   NOW WE HAVE TO PROTECT OURSELVES FROM A ROGUE PRESIDENT. I'M
14
   NOT SAYING PRESIDENT BUSH IS A ROGUE OR ANYTHING. I'M JUST
15
   SAYING THAT TO PROTECT OURSELVES IN THE EVENTUALITY OF A ROGUE
16
   PRESIDENT COMING IN AND WANTING TO TAKE OVER THE WORLD FOR SOME
17
18
   REASON AND THE CONGRESS NOT DECLARING A WAR --
19
             THE COURT:
                               I UNDERSTAND.
             MR. SULLIVAN: IF WE DON'T PUT THIS RESTRAINT ON
20
21
   THE PRESIDENT, WE ARE GOING TO BE -- WE ARE IN TROUBLE.
                                 I DON'T KNOW WHAT -- I DON'T --
22
             THE COURT:
             MR. SULLIVAN: We've had 56 YEARS OF NEEDLESS WARS, YOUR
23
24
   HONOR, WE NEED TO STOP.
             THE COURT: WELL, NEED IT OR NOT, I DON'T
25
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1 KNOW. BUT I'M GOING TO DENY YOUR TEMPORARY RESTRAINING ORDER.

- 2 IF YOU WANT TO FILE ANYTHING FURTHER WITH REGARD TO THEIR MOTION
- 3 TO DISMISS, I'LL BE GLAD TO RECEIVE IT, AND I'LL GIVE YOU TEN
- 4 DAYS TO FILE IT.
- 5 MR. SULLIVAN: SAY THAT AGAIN, SIR.
- 6 THE COURT: IF YOU WANT TO FILE ANYTHING
- 7 FURTHER -- YOU HAVE FILED A REPLY TO THEIR BRIEF. BECAUSE
- 8 YOU'VE HAD VERY LITTLE TIME, I'LL GIVE YOU -- IF YOU WANT TO
- 9 FILE ANYTHING FURTHER, I'LL BE GLAD TO HEAR FROM YOU. FILE IT
- 10 WITHIN TEN DAYS OF TODAY'S DATE.
- 11 MR. SULLIVAN: THANK YOU.
- 12 THE COURT: LET ME SEE YOU ALL AT THE BENCH
- 13 JUST A MOMENT, PLEASE.
- 14 MR. LEPORE: YOUR HONOR, WILL WE GET A REPLY IF
- 15 HE DOES FILE SOMETHING?
- 16 THE COURT: YOU DON'T GET A REPLY TO A REPLY,
- 17 DO YOU, UNDER THE RULES?
- 18 MR. LEPORE: HE'S RESPONDING TO OUR MOTION TO
- 19 DISMISS.
- 20 THE COURT: WELL, THAT'S TRUE, I APOLOGIZE.
- 21 YES, YOU WOULD.
- 22 (BENCH CONFERENCE OFF THE RECORD.)
- THE COURT: THANK YOU ALL VERY MUCH. ADJOURN
- 24 COURT.
- 25 (WHEREUPON, COURT WAS ADJOURNED AT 2:35 P.M.)

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CERTIFICATE OF REPORTER

I, Julie R. Ryan, CCR, contract court reporter for the United States District Court, do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct transcript of the proceedings had in the above-described action.

March 25, 2003
Date

Julie R. Ryan, CCR